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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 This essay examines the benefits and drawbacks of writing about the U.S. Supreme 
Court using the papers1 of the Justices and how the work of Professor James F. Simon 
highlights the benefits.2 The benefits are that the Justices’ papers provide invaluable 
understanding of the Court’s decisionmaking process, the inf luences that are 
significant, and how much substance actually matters. The papers shed light on why 
important legal doctrines developed in certain ways and what arguments held sway, 
identify rules that may be on thin ice in terms of underlying support, and show the 
nature of the working relationships among the Justices, which are critical to the Court’s 
ability to function, and what happens if and when those relationships break down.
 The drawbacks that may derive from using the Justices’ papers include treating 
the notes of Justices at their private conferences as verbatim summaries of discussions, 
using evidence of internal uncertainty and division on the Court in close cases to 
attack the validity of Court rulings, and overinterpreting critical or negative 
comments in documents to reflect rifts or feuds where none may have actually existed 
or where the context may be different than what a Justice intended.
 This essay will briefly plot the historical development of reliance on the papers of 
Justices for Supreme Court research and will then reflect on some of the benefits and 
drawbacks, drawing on examples in the work of Professor Simon and others who 
have written about the Court.
ii. frOM saCrOsanCt sECrECY tO arChiVaL aCCEss
 The internal deliberations of the U.S. Supreme Court were considered secret and 
sacrosanct for much of the nation’s history. It was widely assumed and respected that 
the Justices required secrecy to preserve the quality and candor of their discussions of 
cases.3 Without this secrecy, the assumption went, the caliber of deliberations, and 
ultimately of decisionmaking, would be diminished.
 It is not that authors did not write about the Supreme Court. They did write 
judicial biographies and constitutional analyses.4 They just did their scholarly work 
1. Typically, the papers of a Justice may include draft opinions, exchanges of memos among the Justices 
approving of or requesting changes in opinions, memos from law clerks, handwritten notes, and notes 
taken of the discussions at the Court’s closed-door conferences where cases are discussed and decided.
2. This essay is prompted by Supreme Court Narratives: Law, History, and Journalism, the New York Law School 
Law Review’s symposium, which was dedicated to the work of Dean and Professor Emeritus James F. 
Simon, who has written about the Supreme Court both with the private papers of Justices and without 
them. Symposium, Supreme Court Narratives: Law, History, and Journalism, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 423 
(2012–2013), available at www.nylslawreview.com/supreme-court-narratives-law-history-and-journalism/. 
3. For a discussion of the potential dangers of disclosure of secret Court deliberations, see Henry J. Friendly, 
Book Review, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 766 (1958) (reviewing Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished 
Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis: The Supreme Court at Work (1957)). 
4. See, e.g., Catherine Drinker Bowen, Yankee from Olympus: Justice Holmes and His Family 
(1944); Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in 
American Power Politics (1941); Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in 
Constitutional Interpretation (1956); Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (1951); Carl 
Brent Swisher, Roger B. Taney (1935).
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without questioning whether insights from the Court’s inner sanctum might be 
helpful; looking for those insights was not part of the norm. It is also not that Justices 
did not preserve collections of their papers until more recent times. There are 
numerous collections of Supreme Court papers that predate the last fifty years and 
that presumably provide valuable insights into the Court’s inner workings and into 
particular decisions.5
 The old norm is no more. For more than fifty years now, the internal deliberations 
of the Justices have fascinated legal historians, lawyers, political scientists, and other 
students of the Court. The change began suddenly with the publication in 1956 of a 
biography of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in which the author, Alpheus Thomas 
Mason, for the first time drew on “slip opinions in various stages of preparation, 
memoranda to and from members of the Court, and Stone’s own record of the 
manner in which certain crucial decisions were hammered into shape.”6 This 
momentous occasion, using Stone’s internal Court papers, was soon followed by 
Alexander Bickel’s publication in 1957 of a collection of unpublished Court opinions 
written by Justice Louis Brandeis.7
 This turn of events was shocking to some. When the Stone biography was 
published, Justice Hugo Black told his son, Hugo Jr., that when the Justice retired or 
died, portions of his Court papers should be burned, including notes from the 
Justices’ conferences and some exchanges of memos.8 Concerned that the publication 
of conversations between Justices would inhibit the exchange of free ideas, Hugo Jr. 
did burn a substantial portion of Black’s papers as directed.9 Publication of the 
Brandeis opinions triggered debate more than shock. Henry Friendly, a respected 
New York lawyer, former Brandeis law clerk, and later a judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote a review of Bickel’s book in 1957.10 He 
suggested that there might be no harm in the disclosure of the Brandeis opinions 
because sufficient time had elapsed, but that when the issue was papers involving 
Justices who were still sitting on the Court, “perhaps some such restriction ought to 
5. For example, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress houses the papers of Chief Justice 
Roger Taney, the first Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Horace Gray, Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller, 
and Justice Salmon P. Chase, just to name a few.
6. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law, at xi (1956).
7. Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis: The Supreme 
Court at Work (1957).
8. Hugo Black, Jr., My Father: A Remembrance 250–51 (1975) (describing Justice Black ’s 
instructions to his son to retrieve the Justice’s papers from the courthouse and promptly destroy them; 
Hugo Jr. recalled his father’s concern that “publishing the notes of conversations between Justices 
inhibited the free exchange of ideas” among the members of the Court). A similar account was told to 
the author by Justice Brennan. Interview with William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 24, 1986). Black’s concern was that Court memos he had written that were 
part of Stone’s papers had been taken out of context in Mason’s book.
9. Black, supra note 8, at 251–52, 255.
10. Friendly, supra note 3.
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be imposed by rule of the Court if the good taste of authors does not produce 
voluntary observance.”11
 The Stone and Brandeis books broke the ice, but they did not immediately shift 
the paradigm from author analysis of the Supreme Court to revelation of inside 
details. There were many Supreme Court books written in the 1960s and 1970s that 
did reflect the author’s access to the private papers of Justices.12 Still, the idea that 
there was a story behind the opinions and behind the secrecy of the Supreme Court 
had just begun to take hold. Reporters began to take an interest in the functioning of 
the Court as an institution.13
 But the paradigm did shift with several works contributing to the change. 
Richard Kluger’s seminal study of the Brown v. Board of Education school 
desegregation ruling, published in 1976, relied to some degree on internal Court 
papers to help reconstruct what took place behind the scenes in the Court.14 By far 
the most controversial penetration of the Court’s secrecy came in 1979 with Bob 
Woodward and Scott Armstrong’s publication of the bestseller The Brethren.15 The 
authors interviewed Justices and many law clerks and amassed internal documents to 
chronicle the deliberations of the Court for the period from 1969 through 1976. The 
authors explained that they hoped to break through the secrecy because “the Court, 
unlike the Congress and the Presidency, has by and large escaped public scrutiny.”16 
The content of the book was based on “internal memoranda between Justices, letters, 
notes taken at conference, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts of 
opinions and, in several instances, drafts that were never circulated even to the other 
Justices.”17 Publication of the book caused much consternation inside the Court, both 
before its release and after it hit the bookstores.18 The preparation of The Brethren 
was done by the authors collecting Court papers directly from former law clerks and 
11. Id. at 766.
12. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography (1968); see also 
William F. Swindler, Court and Constitution in the 20th Century: The Old Legality 
1889–1932 (1969); William F. Swindler, Court and the Constitution in the 20th Century: 
The New Legality 1932–1968 (1970); William F. Swindler, Court and the Constitution in 
the 20th Century: The Modern Interpretation (1974).
13. See Nina Totenberg, The Supreme Court: The Last Plantation, New Times, July 26, 1974, at 26 (describing 
oppressive working conditions for laborers at the Supreme Court).
14. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of brown v. board of Education and Black 
America’s Struggle for Equality 819, 822–23 (1976). According to the source notes, Kluger used 
the papers of Justices Harold H. Burton and Felix Frankfurter, among other materials.
15. Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (1979).
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 4.
18. For an account of the reaction to the book and the effort to figure out who the sources were, see David J. 
Garrow, The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 Const. Comment. 303 (2001). Another account 
containing details of the reviews for the book is Alexander Wohl, Those Who Do Not Remember the Past . . . 
Closed Chambers—An Eerie Echo Eighteen Years After The Brethren, Jurist: Books-on-Law (May 
1998), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/pamay98.htm.
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perhaps Justices themselves; the authors apparently did not make much use, if any, of 
collections of Justices’ papers held at archives such as the Manuscript Division of the 
Library of Congress, perhaps because of restrictions on access to those materials at 
the time.19
 Just four years after The Brethren’s release, the largest foray into the collections of 
the private papers of Justices came with the publication in 1983 of a lengthy and 
detailed account of the Warren Court.20 The book, Super Chief, made extensive use 
of collections of Justices’ papers at the Library of Congress and elsewhere.21 The 
author, Bernard Schwartz, was provided access to collections that were otherwise 
still closed to researchers, including the full Warren Court files of Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr.22 Schwartz created detailed accounts of major Warren Court cases, 
describing the private conference discussions of the Justices based on the notes taken 
by various members of the Court and outlining the drafting of and negotiating over 
opinions among the Justices. One reviewer said the book more closely resembled “an 
annotated set of internal minutes for October Terms 1953 through 1968.”23
 Unlike The Brethren, which created a furor over the sanctity of the Court’s 
deliberations, Super Chief prompted little or no reaction just four years later. One 
reason might be that The Brethren dealt with a more contemporaneous period of 
Court decisions; it was published in 1979 and covered decisions as recent as 1976. 
The proximity made the disclosures seem more important and more dramatic. Super 
Chief, in contrast, was not published until fourteen years after the last decisions 
discussed in the book. When The Brethren was published, most of the Justices 
discussed in the book were still sitting on the Court, while for Super Chief only a few 
were still sitting at the time of publication.24
19. Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 15, at xviii–xix. When The Brethren was published in 1979, 
the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress housed papers that covered the period from 1969 to 
1976 for Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had retired at the start of the period, Justice Hugo L. Black, 
Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. But there were a variety of restrictions 
that limited the access to these papers and that likely made them off limits to authors Woodward and 
Armstrong. There continue to be some restrictions on who can access the manuscripts, even for those 
that are accessible online. See Using the Collections, Library of Congress Manuscript Reading 
Room, http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/mss-use.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
20. The Warren Court bears the name of Chief Justice Earl Warren, who presided from 1953 to 1969.
21. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court—A Judicial Biography, 
at xii (1983).
22. Justice Brennan joined the Warren Court in 1956. In interviews for the biography written by this 
author, Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 490–91 (2010), 
Justice Brennan acknowledged that he gave Bernard Schwartz access to his Court papers.
23. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief: Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 922, 927 
(1983).
24. In 1983 when Super Chief was published, the only Justices in the book who were still sitting on the 
Court were William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and Byron White. When The Brethren was 
published in 1979, Justices discussed in the book who were still sitting on the Court were Chief Justice 
Warren Burger and Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Harry Blackmun, William H. Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens.
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 A second reason for the difference in public reaction may be that The Brethren was 
written in dramatic prose by two visible and prominent journalists and marketed with 
a high degree of emphasis on the breach of the Court’s secrecy;25 Super Chief was 
issued by an academic press and written by a law professor in clinical narrative. What 
the two books share, however, is the changing of the paradigm. After the publication 
of The Brethren and Super Chief, the standard operating procedure for many—though 
certainly not all—books about the Supreme Court and biographies of Justices seemed 
to shift to extensive reliance on inside information, canvassing of Justices’ papers, and 
interviews with former law clerks and others with knowledge of the inner workings of 
the Court.26 There are, of course, still authors who choose to emphasize their own 
analysis and do not rely on access to Court papers or to inside information.27
 Still another book that contributed to the culture of inside information about the 
Court was written by Edward Lazarus,28 a lawyer who clerked for Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun in the October Term 1988.29 Lazarus explained that while his clerkship 
provided him insight into how things work at the Court, he did independent research 
and gathered documents that were not derived from his clerkship.30 His book, Closed 
Chambers, stirred up some controversy because it depicted the Court in highly 
25. The Simon & Schuster book jacket for the original edition says the book “is the first detailed behind-
the-scenes account” of the Court, written in “spellbinding” fashion that “reveals as never before the 
implications of power and inf luence” in the Court.
26. Bernard Schwartz continued to contribute heavily to this trend, milking the papers of Justice Brennan 
and others for a steady stream of books. For works by Bernard Schwartz that continued this trend, see 
Bernard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action (1990); 
Bernard Schwartz, Behind bakkE: Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court (1988); 
Bernard Schwartz, Decision: How the Supreme Court Decides Cases (1996); Bernard 
Schwartz, swann ’s Way: The School Busing Case and the Supreme Court (1986); Bernard 
Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Burger Court (1988); Bernard Schwartz, The 
Unpublished Opinions of the Rehnquist Court (1996); Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished 
Opinions of the Warren Court (1985). Other books that contributed to the genre were Howard 
Ball, Hugo Black: Cold Steel Warrior (1996); Joan Biskupic, Sandra Day O’Connor: How 
the First Woman on the Supreme Court Became Its Most Influential Justice (2005); Philip 
J. Cooper, Battles on the Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court (1995); David J. 
Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of roE v. wadE (1994); 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography (1994); David G. Savage, 
Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court (1992) (relying on interviews 
with law clerks and Justices more than on access to Court papers); Mark V. Tushnet, Making 
Constitutional Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1961–1991 (1997). 
27. For examples of works that are analytical and that do not rely on inside papers and records, see Mark V. 
Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 
(2005); see also Eric J. Segall, Supreme Myths: Why the Supreme Court Is Not a Court and 
Its Justices Are Not Judges (2012).
28. Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles 
Inside the Supreme Court (1998).
29. A Supreme Court Term typically runs from the first Monday in October (set by federal statute) to late 
June. Terms are referred to by the year in which they begin, so the 1988–89 Court year in which 
Lazarus clerked is the October Term 1988. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
30. Lazarus, supra note 28, at xi. 
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political and partisan terms, much as The Brethren had nearly twenty years earlier. 
Lazarus said he offered an examination of disputes that “tear at the fabric of the 
Court’s internal culture” and a “clear window into the unsettling interactions of 
Justices and law clerks as they write the law of the land.”31 His account heavily 
emphasized the political divide and personal agendas in the Court and placed great 
weight on the role of the law clerks. Few works since Closed Chambers have taken as 
strong a view of the Court as an overtly divided political institution.
iii. thE bEnEfits and draWbaCks Of rELYing On COUrt papErs
 A. The Benefits
 The most important lessons from works based on the Justices’ papers are twofold: 
first, the revelation of internal deliberations by and large shows the Court working as 
one might expect—engaged in serious, analytical deliberations over substantive legal 
issues; and second, in part because of the first point, the disclosures for the most part 
have not tarnished the Court’s reputation as some Justices and others feared would 
be the case. Books like The Brethren convey the impression that much of what goes 
on inside the Court is driven by political agendas. Politics no doubt play a role in 
some Supreme Court decisions. The papers of the Justices, however, show that there 
is usually much more than politics at work inside the Court and that within the 
Court substantive legal issues really do matter.
 Consider Professor Simon’s extensive account of an important civil rights ruling 
in 1989.32 In the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court held that an 
1866 civil rights law prohibiting race discrimination in making contracts did not 
apply to racial harassment in the workplace.33 Simon describes in infinite detail how, 
when the Court first considered the case in the spring of 1988, a new conservative 
majority34 emerged to reconsider an earlier precedent35 that held the 1866 law 
prohibited race discrimination in private contracts, not just racial bias by state and 
local governments.36 The earlier ruling, from 1976, was considered a crucial tool for 
enforcement by civil rights groups, as Simon describes.37 After the Court reargued 
Patterson in October 1988, internal Court papers show, somewhat surprisingly, that 
there was no strong support for overruling the 1976 precedent. Moreover, Justice 
31. Id. at 12.
32. James F. Simon, The Center Holds: The Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Court 20–81 
(1995).
33. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
34. The new majority consisted of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justices Byron White, 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. See Simon, supra note 32, at 20.
35. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcement of private 
contracts, not just when state action is present).
36. Simon, supra note 32, at 20, 28–31, 37–41.
37. Id. at 40.
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Brennan initially had a narrow, 5-4 Court majority to hold that the racial harassment 
violated the 1866 law. Brennan’s fifth vote was Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a 
newcomer when the Court first considered the case in February 1988.38
 Although the vote to preserve the earlier precedent remained solid, Simon 
describes how Kennedy wavered and, despite Brennan’s extensive efforts to persuade 
him, eventually switched his vote to create a majority against applying the 1866 law 
to racial harassment on the job.39 Kennedy’s reasoning, along with the Court majority, 
was that racial harassment in the workplace once an employee was already on the job 
was not racial bias in the making of an employment contract.40 As Simon describes 
it, Brennan relied on the legislative history of the 1866 law to say that the presence of 
racial harassment in the workplace could suggest the lack of good faith in the making 
of a contract that is free of racial bias.41 Kennedy acknowledged that there was some 
merit to Brennan’s reading of the legislative history, according to Simon.42 But 
Kennedy explained that as a matter of principle he was not willing to use legislative 
history to substantially broaden the reach of a statute beyond the language that 
Congress wrote, and he believed that Brennan’s opinion did just that.43 So Brennan 
and Kennedy differed fundamentally over how to use legislative history generally and 
over how to read the statute in this case.
 Simon’s account, a virtual play-by-play of how the case unfolded behind the 
scenes, demonstrates the Court’s focus on substantive legal issues. To be sure, the 
narrative also examines an especially tense and divisive moment late in the case when 
Brennan and then Kennedy first escalated and then toned down their written 
criticism of one another’s draft written opinions.44 In the hands of another writer, the 
incident might have been hyped as reflecting a deep-seated personal rift between the 
newcomer Kennedy and the close-to-retirement Brennan.45 But Simon’s account 
shows that, politics aside, at least some of the exchange between Kennedy and 
Brennan, with Justice Stevens trying to mediate between them, reflected concern for 
the image of the Court that might be harmed by publication of harsh criticism 
among the Justices. Again, this description of a potentially volatile, previously secret 
internal dispute did not tarnish the reputation of the Court and instead gave a 
realistic picture of the negotiations and interactions that take place.
 In some circles, the Patterson decision was viewed through a political lens, 
showing that the Rehnquist Court would be a more conservative institution than its 
38. Id. at 30, 48–49.
39. Id. at 54–61.
40. Id. at 57.
41. Id. at 60. 
42. Id. at 57.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 64, 71–79.
45. Kennedy took his seat on the Court on February 18, 1988. Brennan retired on July 20, 1990.
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predecessors.46 But of far greater significance, Simon’s account shows the Court 
wrangling over the meaning of the language of the 1866 law, struggling to determine 
what Congress intended more than one hundred years earlier, and trying to determine 
whether state contract law definitions had any relevance.47 Rather than compromise 
the reputation of the Court or depict the Justices as overly political, the account 
shows the Court worrying about the substance of the law—pretty much what you 
want the Justices to be doing.
 There is another valuable lesson to be learned about how the Court operates 
from works that rely on the papers of the Justices. Many such accounts demonstrate 
clearly that most of the Court’s serious, substantive work is done in writing, not in 
conversation. Perhaps because of writing style, perhaps for other reasons, some earlier 
works, like The Brethren, leave the impression that much of the Court’s business is 
carried out in personal conversations among the Justices.48 In numerous places in The 
Brethren, reactions by one Justice to the draft opinion of another are recounted as if 
they were verbal comments, rather than written internal memos.49 Some more recent 
works emphasize these personal interactions as an integral part of the decisionmaking 
among Justices, even when the contacts may actually be superfluous.
 For example, in her well-received 2007 study of liberal-conservative struggles 
within the Court,50 network reporter Jan Crawford51 described a 1992 encounter in 
which Justice Kennedy changed his mind about the constitutionality of a graduation 
prayer while writing a majority opinion and changed the outcome of the case, thereby 
striking down the prayer.52 The book says,
Kennedy left his chambers and walked down . . . to see Rehnquist. Apologetic 
and embarrassed, Kennedy delivered the news. In writing the opinion for the 
majority to allow the prayer, Kennedy had changed his mind about the result. 
He’d written a decision ruling instead that the prayer was unconstitutional . . . 
46. Simon, supra note 32, at 79–80.
47. Id. at 54–81.
48. Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 15.
49. For example, in describing the Court’s work on a death penalty case in the early 1970s, The Brethren 
observes, “Stewart agreed with Brennan that White was unpredictable.” Id. at 216. This is one of a 
number of places that give the reader the sense of Justices Brennan and Stewart sitting in one of their 
offices discussing Justice White, rather than indicating that it is a conclusion based on the authors’ 
reporting. See also the discussion of two cases about unanimous jury verdicts in 1972, where the book 
says, “Burger tried to get Powell to switch.” Id. at 222. Was this a one-on-one conversation between 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, as the narrative seems to imply? Or might it have been in a 
written memo from Burger to Powell? The book provides no answer.
50. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Control 
of the United States Supreme Court (2007).
51. At the time Supreme Conflict was published, Crawford used the name Jan Crawford Greenburg. She now 
publishes using the name Jan Crawford. 
52. Greenburg, supra note 50, at 139–40, 145–50 (discussing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
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There was nothing Rehnquist could do . . . so he advised him to go ahead and 
circulate his draft opinion.53
To be sure, the story is well told, and the book in some other places makes use of 
Justices’ papers. But this story of a conversation between Kennedy and Rehnquist 
actually contributes little to understanding the Court. Kennedy did not need to 
notify Rehnquist in person—a memo would have sufficed—and the fact that they 
met face to face has no real significance for how the case came out or how the legal 
arguments unfolded. Nothing really happened in that face-to-face meeting; all 
developments of importance in the case took place in writing. 
 It is virtually impossible to come away from time spent researching in collections 
of Justices’ papers without acquiring a fascination for reconstructing the paper trail of 
a case—that is, assembling in chronological order the exchanges of memos and draft 
opinions that make up a case file. The fascination is to try to track what happened in 
the case—when did Justices express their views and what impact did those expressions 
have on initial and subsequent draft opinions and on the final product? Getting 
caught up in that web of chronological reconstruction and intrigue also leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that it is the written exchanges that matter most to the 
Court.54 That is not to say that one-on-one discussions do not happen and do not 
play an important role. Personal conversations outside the Justices’ conference room 
do take place and may sometimes play a crucial role. The point is simply that 
important, game-changing conversations are rarer than the image of the Court that 
is conveyed in some books like The Brethren.
 The written files of Justices also convey another important message—that the 
Justices remain cordial and collegial even when there are sharp differences of opinion. 
The impression that comes through in Justices’ papers has two parts to it. First, the 
Justices are not saints and do show frustrations with one another, sometimes in 
scribbled notes on draft opinions, sometimes in memos to law clerks, and sometimes 
even in memos to other Justices. But second, those expressions of frustration and 
disagreement are rarely personal, and the Justices, more than many leaders in 
Washington, understand that all nine of them have to sit at the same conference 
table together again the next day.
 Like other mortals, they have reactions, feel frustrations, and become vested in 
their work product and in the outcomes of cases. It is enlightening to see some of 
those feelings and frustrations expressed in comments in the margins of draft 
opinions. Indeed it is instructive to see the Justices vent their disagreements and 
53. Id. at 149.
54. Justice Brennan emphasized this point in interviews with the author. Referring to making changes and 
working with his colleagues, Brennan said, “And to the extent I modify my initial effort, I do it, as you 
know, constantly and prefer to do it by exchanges, written exchanges, between me and any of my 
colleagues who want to do that sort of thing, and all of them do . . . . And to the extent that I’ve been 
successful in so-called massing a court in that way, that’s because I’ve been perfectly willing to negotiate 
revisions, changes, deletions, additions that are not inconsistent, as I see it, with my own view of the 
proper result in the case.” Interview with William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Wash., D.C. (Apr. 15, 1987).
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frustrations, more often than not within the confines of their own chambers, and 
then return to work with their colleagues.
 Consider the example of Justice Brennan and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. The 
two developed a strong professional relationship that became a critical facet of the 
Court under Chief Justice Warren E. Burger.55 Brennan owed much of his legendary 
influence to Powell’s willingness to work with him to reach a majority consensus on 
many important issues, and the two worked well together.56
 But when Brennan in 1982 found himself in a tussle with Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor over habeas corpus,57 Powell was on the other side, giving O’Connor a 
7–2 victory. When Powell got his first glimpse of the dissenting opinion that Brennan 
circulated to all of his colleagues, Powell wrote on his own copy, “No one is kinder 
or more generous than WJB until he takes up his pen in dissent.”58 When Brennan 
labeled O’Connor’s opinion an example of “ judicial activism,”59 a somewhat 
incredulous Powell scrawled on his copy, “Who’s calling who what?”60
 But while the comments, frustrations, and observations come through in the 
papers of Justices, so too does the collegiality that is a way of life at the Court. The 
collegiality is well illustrated in the same Court Term by a letter from the newcomer 
O’Connor to Brennan at the end of the Term.61 Although the two Justices fought 
hard over habeas corpus and other issues, she wrote Brennan “to express my 
appreciation for your kindness during my first Term on the Court.”62
 These examples together paint a realistic picture of the dynamic of nine powerful 
individuals struggling with difficult issues and sometimes with each other while 
maintaining a high degree of professional collegiality for the sake of their working 
relationships. This picture of the Court is an important contribution from study of 
Court papers. And the picture is all too often obscured as many recent works focus 
on conflict and personality within the Court. In his best-selling book, The Nine,63 
Jeffrey Toobin refers to Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. at one point as a “warrior.”64 
Elsewhere Toobin asserts, “still, when it comes to the incendiary political issues that 
end up in the Supreme Court, what matters is not the quality of the arguments but 
55. Chief Justice Warren Burger was the presiding Justice on the Court from 1969 to 1986. Justice Lewis 
Powell was appointed to the Court in 1972 and served until 1987. Powell was frequently the swing vote 
on the Burger Court, determining whether the liberal or conservative bloc would prevail. See Stern & 
Wermiel, supra note 22, at 360–67, 496–97.
56. See id. at 476.
57. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); see also Stern & Wermiel, supra note 22, at 478.
58. Stern & Wermiel, supra note 22, at 479. 
59. Engle, 456 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stern & Wermiel, supra note 22, at 479. 
60. Stern & Wermiel, supra note 22, at 479.
61. Justice O’Connor was sworn in and took her seat on the Court on September 24, 1981.
62. Stern & Wermiel, supra note 22, at 480 (citing a letter from O’Connor to Brennan on June 28, 1982).
63. Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (2007).
64. Id. at 335.
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the identity of the justices.”65 Toobin explained that he was talking about the 
individual judicial philosophies of the Justices,66 but his book clearly underscores the 
importance of personal interactions and chemistry among the Justices. Toobin 
describes Justice Stephen G. Breyer reading a dissenting opinion from the bench in 
which Breyer takes an apparent dig at Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr. in an important 2007 case limiting the use of race in public school student 
placements.67 “At this direct slap, Alito roused himself and stared across the bench at 
Breyer. Roberts didn’t change expression, but the muscles in his jaw twitched,” 
Toobin wrote.68 The description makes for good drama and adds personal involvement 
to the narrative of what might otherwise be dry accounts of cases. But does the 
drama really capture a personal tension that is important to the functioning of the 
Court? No doubt any group of nine individuals who spend as much time together 
deciding important issues will experience moments of frustration. The papers of the 
Justices suggest that they work hard to achieve a high degree of cordiality that, in 
terms of the inner workings of the Court, supersedes moments of tension or 
frustration that can be easily captured.
 Nowhere is the emphasis on personal conf lict more apparent than in the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the individual mandate of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.69 Reaction to and analysis of the decision 
focused on the impact of the law and of the Court’s limitations on the power of 
Congress. But the commentary and reporting also put the spotlight on personal 
tension within the Court’s conservative wing, highlighting an alleged conf lict 
between Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, 
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito over Roberts’s decision to vote to uphold the 
law.70 Friction no doubt did exist in such a high-stakes case, but if the lessons from 
examination of past cases in Justices’ papers hold true, it is unlikely that the personal 
conflict played the major role in deciding the case, or even that the conflict lasted 
beyond the immediate end of the Court Term.
 Still another value gleaned from the Justices’ papers may be an awareness of 
when a legal doctrine is on shaky ground and could be ripe for reconsideration or 
revision. This is not to say that a precedent should be disrespected or, worse, 
disregarded simply because there is evidence of internal discomfort among the 
Justices. A precedent remains just that, unless and until it is overruled or distinguished. 
65. Id. at 339.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 334–36 (discussing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007)).
68. Id. at 336.
69. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
70. See Jan Crawford, Discord at Supreme Court is Deep, and Personal, CBSNews.com (July 8, 2012), http://
w w w.cbsnews .com /8301-34 60 _162-574 68202/d iscord-at-supreme-cou r t-i s-deep-and-
personal/?tag=exclsv (reporting that frustration among conservative Justices over the apparent change 
of heart by Roberts will affect relationships at the Court for some time to come).
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A five-to-four decision accompanied by a strong dissent is still a decision of the 
Court, entitled to respect.
 Yet there is nothing wrong with advocates knowing that an attack on a legal 
doctrine established by the Court may get a more favorable reception because there is 
disagreement among the Justices. Or conversely, knowing that support is weak for a 
doctrine may help advocates figure out arguments to shore up a line of reasoning. To 
date, there is little evidence that Supreme Court advocates are making these 
calculations based on internal documents rather than on published majority and 
separate concurring or dissenting opinions.
 But there are examples of doctrines shown to face growing doubts and uncertainty 
within the Court. For example, the papers of several Justices reveal how quickly 
concerns developed about the application of the First Amendment to protect the 
news media from libel lawsuits by public officials and public figures. The ink on the 
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan was scarcely dry before some Justices began to 
see pitfalls in the doctrine.71 The existence of doubts about the direction of libel law 
is not a secret; it is reflected in the dissenting and concurring opinions of Justices in 
cases spanning the 1960s through the 1980s.72 The extent of those doubts—and the 
efforts to save Sullivan by its author, Justice Brennan—was not known outside the 
Court. A deeper understanding of the Court’s doctrine, and of the concerns over its 
scope, might inform future litigation on the subject.
 The same point may be true of other important and controversial Court decisions 
and doctrines. Lawyers litigating cases over affirmative action in higher education 
might benefit from examining and understanding the internal deliberations of the 
Court in earlier cases.73 The arguments in future abortion litigation might be 
enhanced by examination of the internal deliberations over the meaning of the 
“undue burden” standard established in earlier cases,74 especially since there appears 
to be some disagreement within the Court about what the standard means and how 
71. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (holding that public figures may recover damages for libel from news media 
defendants only upon a showing of actual malice, meaning knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth). For a discussion of these issues, see Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Making of Modern Libel 
Law: A Glimpse Behind the Scenes, 29 Commc’n Lawyer 1 (June 2012) (describing the internal struggles 
within the Court over the scope of First Amendment application to libel law).
72. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. 
at 763 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
73. In the Court’s most recent decision upholding affirmative action in higher education, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Justices expended considerable time and effort debating the meaning 
and intent of an earlier ruling, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in 
which the Court was deeply divided.
74. The Court, by plurality decision, held that abortion regulations are unconstitutional if they impose an 
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992), revising the earlier standard from Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000), Justice Kennedy, 
who had joined the plurality that created the undue burden standard, dissented and disagreed with 
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter over the meaning of undue burden.
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it should be applied.75 Examining the earlier deliberations may not provide clear 
answers for future cases, but there may be useful insights in some cases from the 
papers of the Justices.
 B. The Drawbacks
 Analysis of the work of the Supreme Court through the papers of the Justices 
may have some drawbacks as well—or at least points of debate and controversy.
 Foremost among the controversies is the use of the conference notes of Justices. 
To understand the controversy, it is important to understand what conference notes 
are. The nine Justices meet in private, with no one else present in the room, to both 
determine which cases they will hear and eventually decide and to vote and, at least 
initially, decide cases just heard by the Court. A Justice typically takes notes on the 
comments made at conference by the other Justices. The main purpose of the notes 
appears to be for that Justice’s later reference; when a Justice is subsequently writing 
an opinion in a case, the Justice and law clerks may refer to the notes to determine 
the basis on which the Court agreed to decide the case.
 The conference notes of Justices pose a number of challenges as research sources. 
To some scholars, using conference notes represents the brass ring because the 
conference itself is the ultimate inner sanctum. “The secrecy of the conference is, 
indeed, one of the great continuing Court traditions,” wrote Bernard Schwartz for 
his study of the Warren Court.76
 So what is the problem? Schwartz used the shorthand, scribbled notes of the 
Justices to transform accounts of the conferences into verbatim conversations. This 
was a surprising undertaking and a dubious process for a respected and prodigious 
legal scholar of Schwartz’s caliber.77 Super Chief is filled with conference statements 
and conversations in quotation marks as if to suggest that these are the precise words 
spoken by the Justices in the inner sanctum. But of course, even if the Justices knew 
shorthand, and there is no evidence that any of them did, the scrawled notes are just 
that—notes. They were not written as verbatim quotes or as anything more than an 
effort to capture the essential core of a colleague’s view. In fairness, Schwartz 
acknowledged that he was reconstituting statements from notes.78 “I have tried to 
reconstruct the conferences in most of the cases discussed,” he wrote.79 
 There is undoubtedly value in learning what the Justices said when discussing 
some cases. But does the value outweigh the titillation? Is the value sufficiently great 
to take the step of recreating conversations that undoubtedly never actually took 
place in the precise form in which they were reported?
75. Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 (2000), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
76. Schwartz, supra note 21, at xi.
77. Schwartz, who died in 1997, was a law professor at New York University School of Law for forty-five 
years before spending his final years teaching at the University of Tulsa College of Law.
78. Schwartz, supra note 21, at xi. 
79. Id.
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 Schwartz is not alone. Perhaps spurred in part by Super Chief, author Del 
Dickson80 published a lengthy volume in 2001 that was not part of a biography or a 
Supreme Court history. Its sole purpose was to recreate the conference discussions of 
the Justices in 300 major cases.81 Dickson explained, “Instead of simply publishing 
the Justices’ notes verbatim, they were carefully edited in the spirit of what they 
are—abbreviated versions of what was actually said in conference.”82 He wrote, 
“sentence fragments have been completed and abbreviations made whole, so that the 
notes read more as they were originally spoken in conference.”83
 Let’s consider the credibility of this notion for a moment. First, recall that the 
notes in question are not those of the speaker, but rather of one or more among eight 
listeners. Second, the very assumption on which these reconstructions of conference 
discussions are based is unproven. In what rulebook is it spelled out that the Justice’s 
notes are attempts at shorthand accounts of verbatim statements, rather than attempts 
to capture the essence of the speaker’s ideas? Third, even if the Justices as note-takers 
did a reasonably careful job of recording what others said, does the reconstruction of 
the conversations take into account the possibility, perhaps even probability, that the 
notes are filtered through the note-taking Justice’s own perspective on the case?84
 The main focus of Justice Black’s papers-burning admonition to his son was 
Black’s conference notes.85 This was because Black feared that the candor of 
discussion would be compromised if the confidentiality of the conference room were 
breached. But Black was also concerned over the very substantial problem that any 
verbal statement or written document may be taken out of the context in which it 
was originally intended by the speaker or author. So yet another problem in the 
reconstruction of conference notes is that even the most accurate composite of notes 
taken by other Justices may lack the context of what the speaker intended when 
discussing a case. Reconstructed conversations at the conferences can at best only 
guess at the context, tone, and intent of the Justice who was the speaker.
 The problem of context is not limited to conference notes. There is a risk that any 
document prepared by one Justice and then considered by another Justice or by a 
researcher may be seen in a context other than the one intended by the author. The 
problem is all the more acute because a typical case file in one Justice’s papers will 
include the work product of other Justices in the form of memos and draft opinions. 
80. Del Dickson, J.D., Ph.D., is a well-regarded political science professor at the University of San Diego.
81. The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985): The Private Discussions Behind Nearly 300 
Supreme Court Decisions (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
82. Id. at xix.
83. Id.
84. For example, there are places in the conference notes of Justice Brennan where the notation next to 
Justice Thurgood Marshall simply says, “Agreed with me.” That is clearly not a verbatim account of 
what Marshall said in those instances; at the very least, Marshall probably said, “I agree with my brother 
Brennan,” or something along those lines. But it is equally plausible that Marshall said a bit more and 
Brennan filtered it as, “Agreed with me.” 
85. For a discussion of Black’s concerns see supra text accompanying note 8.
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Justice Brennan recalled86 looking at a copy of the Mason biography of Justice Stone87 
in Justice Black’s home study and witnessing Black launch into a tirade against the 
book. Black was affronted because Mason took memos written by Black and described 
them through Stone’s eyes—out of the context in which Black intended them.
 It is incumbent on researchers and writers who use internal Court papers to try 
to overcome the problem of lack of context when recounting exchanges among 
Justices. Users of conference notes face a virtually insurmountable challenge in trying 
to present accounts that are accurate both as to what was said and as to the context.
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 There was a time when Justices and some Court practitioners argued that the 
Supreme Court would be harmed, perhaps irreparably, by research incursions into the 
internal papers of Justices. When the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall were 
released upon his death in 1993, only two years after he retired so that internal details 
of two-year-old decisions were revealed, then-Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
wrote to the Librarian of Congress to protest.88 Speaking for a majority of the Court, 
Rehnquist wrote that he was “surprised and disappointed” at the release of Marshall’s 
papers so soon after his death.89 The letter warned the Library of Congress that 
Justices might look elsewhere for library repositories for their papers.
 But the release of the Marshall papers, as well as those of Justices William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Harry Blackmun, Byron R. White, Lewis Powell, and others have done 
no harm to the Court’s reputation, although the public popularity of the institution 
ranks low in recent polls.90 If anything, the use of the papers to explain the Court 
and its decisions shows the institution hard at work, debating and negotiating over 
86. Interview with William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 24, 
1986) (“But, one day at Hugo Black’s, my wife, Marge, and I were at Hugo Black’s for dinner one night. 
And I happened to see Alpheus Mason’s biography of Stone. And I just picked it up and said, gee, this 
guy, Mason, has certainly done a hell of a good job, because he’d done Brandeis, you know, and Stone. 
And he did one hell of a good job. And Hugo went through the roof. He said, and then he told me this 
story, that there were—there are in that biography many quotes from memoranda that Stone’s wife had 
turned over to Mason as part of Stone’s papers. And they were memoranda about various cases and what 
had happened, just along the lines of mine and who did what and why, and so forth. And Hugo Black 
said that they were all a bunch of goddamned lies. Just a bunch of goddamned lies. Nothing like that 
ever happened in that case. This is what happened, and so forth . . . Well Hugo said finally, ‘I’m going 
to take care of that. By God, I’ve got memoranda of various things. I’m going to order all my papers 
destroyed . . . .’”). 
87. Mason, supra note 6.
88. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to James H. Billington, 
Librarian of Congress (May 25, 1993) (on file with the author). 
89. Id.
90. See Supreme Court Ratings Down in Pew Poll, Associated Press (May 1, 2012, 3:46 PM), available at 
http://www.wtop.com/?nid=319&sid=2848827 (“The Pew Research Center says 52 percent of 
Americans have a favorable opinion of the court, the lowest rating since the group started asking 
Americans their view of the high court in 1987.”). 
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important legal doctrine and struggling to agree on substantive results. The works of 
Professor James Simon provide strong support for this conclusion.
 With a few exceptions discussed above, the story of using the papers of Supreme 
Court Justices is a success story—for researchers, for students of the Court, and for 
the credibility of the Justices.
